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Abstract
Medical systems are designed for a range of end users from different professional skill groups and people who carry the
devices in and on their bodies. Open, accurate, and efficient communication is the priority for medical systems and
consequently strong protection costs are traded against the utility benefits for open systems. In this paper we assess the
vulnerabilities created by the professional and end user expectations, and theorise ways to mitigate wireless security
vulnerabilities. The benefits of wireless medical services are great in terms of efficiencies, mobility, and information
management. These benefits may be realised by treating the vulnerabilities and reducing the cost of adverse events. The
purpose of this paper is to raise and to discuss key issues so that others may be motivated to treat the problems and to
better optimise the trade-off for design improvement.
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INTRODUCTION
The deployment of wireless communications in medical healthcare environment has expanded to meet the clinical
requirements (Nita, Creta & Hariton, 2011; Paquette, 2011; Topol, 2011). Many medical devices, such as telemetry, pulse
oximetry monitors, electrocardiography (ECG) carts, neuro-stimulators, infusion pumps, insulin pumps, pacemakers,
implantable cardioverter defibrillators (ICD) and drug pumps, use the wireless communication technologies as these
wireless medical devices allow the continuous monitoring of users’ health in the real-time (Ren, Pazzi & Boukerche.,
2010; Censi, Calcagnini, Matter, Triventi & Beutolini, 2010; Petkovic, 2009; Meingast, Ravsta & Sastry, 2006). Wireless
services also allow mobility of patients, time-space flexibility for staff and automated information management. The staffpatient relationship is made less structured and more socially integrated so that health services are seen as a natural part
of daily life (Arney, Venkata, Sokotsky & Lee, 2011; Sagahyroon, Aloul, Al-Ali, Bahrololoum, Makhsoos, & Hussein,
2011).
Wireless technologies enable the electronic devices to interconnect and communicate without having the need of physical
wired cabling by using radio frequency transmissions (Karygiannis & Owens, 2002). As a result of advancement in
wireless technologies, the prevalent adoptions of wireless networks offer numerous benefits to users and organizations
(Turab, Aljawarneh, & Masadeh, 2010). These deployments of wireless sensor networks (WSNs), wireless personal area
networks (WPANs), wireless local area networks (WLANs), and wireless body area networks (WBANs) have offered a
significant enrichment in quality of life. In the industries of healthcare, retail, education and entertainment there has been
improvement in mobility, flexibility and productivity (Yuce & Khan, 2012; Darwish & Hassanien, 2011; Turab et al.,
2010). However, the nature of wireless networks also exposes the risks that may harm the users and reduce the potential
benefits (Ngobeni, Venter & Burke, 2010; Radcliffe, 2011). The nature of wireless networking has inherited security and
privacy problems (Halperin, 2008). In addition, the healthcare environment has requirements of open communication
between professionals and patients who are often mobile between diverse geographic locations. Systems are not unified
or standardised. Some common standards may be adopted but the variability in capability, proprietary hardware, and
software, and policies make seamless services difficult. Even with these challenges, the deployment of wireless
technologies in the medical healthcare has delivered benefits (Hanna, Rolles, Molina, Poosankam, Fu & Song, 2011;
Devaraj & Ezra, 2011; Censi, Calcagnini, Mattei, Triventi & Bartolini, 2010). Our concern in this paper is the securing
of these services in such a way that the potential for harm is minimised while the opportunity for patient benefits are
maximised.

BACKGROUND LITERATURE
Security is an essential component of any IT system, either wired or wireless. The main difference between wired and
wireless networks is the vulnerability at the physical layer (Cypher, Chevrollier, Montavont & Golmie, 2010). The
wireless data transmitted in the wireless network is easily captured or eavesdropped by passive or active attackers.
Consequently, built-in wireless security architectures, such as the IEEE 802.11 WLAN standards, and encryption
protocols such as the WEP, WPA, RSN and WPA2 are required to protect and maximise the benefits from wireless
networks (Karygiannis & Owens, 2002; Scarfone, 2008; Bulbul 2008). The security goals for wireless networks are the
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fundamental four of confidentiality, integrity, availability and authentication of users (Al & Yoshigoe, 2011). The
vulnerabilities of wireless networks present risks for the use in any environment. Table 1 summaries the types of risks as
threats a wireless network has on account of its hardware, software and configurations (adapted from Diksha & Shubham,
2006, pp. 2-3; Frankel, Eydt, Owens & Scarfone, 2007, p. 28). The identification of the risks allows management planning
to assure the system benefits are greater than the costs, and in a medical system, all risk of potential impact on services is
mitigated. In this way, adverse impacts on humans are treated and patient safety assured.
Table 1. Types of major threats against wireless networks and devices
(adapted from Diksha & Shubham, 2006, pp. 2-3; Frankel et al., 2007, p. 28)
Threat Type
Description
Ad hoc or Peer-to-Peer Attacker can exploit a wireless client or device after establishing ad hoc connection
(unauthorised client attempt to form ad hoc network with legitimate client). After
Connection
establishing the ad hoc connection, the attacker can perform port scanning to explore and
exploit client vulnerabilities
Client Mis-association Attacker can compromise a corporate wireless client after the client within business
premises mis-associates or connects to an unauthorised external Wi-Fi network (which is
set up by an attacker by using a rogue AP).
Attacker
prevents or prohibits the normal use or management of networks or network
Denial of Service
devices.
(Dos)
Attacker passively monitors network communications for data, including authentication
Eavesdropping
credentials.
Attacker sets up Honeypot AP with a default service set identifier (SSID, network name)
Evil Twin/Honeypot
hotspot SSID, or corporate SSID and observes many wireless clients connect to it and can
AP
then be initiate attacks on connected clients (e.g. stealing passwords by presenting a fake
Facebook login page to clients over the mis-associated wireless connection.
Man-in-the-Middle

Attacker actively intercepts the path of communications between two legitimate parties,
thereby obtaining authentication credentials and data. Attacker can then masquerade as a
legitimate party. In the context of a WLAN, a man-in-the-middle attack can be achieved
through a bogus or rogue AP, which looks like an authorised AP to legitimate parties.

Masquerading

Attacker impersonates an authorised user and gains certain authorised privileges.

Message Modification

Attacker alters a legitimate message by deleting, adding to, changing or recording it.

Message Replay

Attacker passively monitors transmissions and retransmits messages, acting as if the
attacker were a legitimate user.
Attacker can take advantage of a potential security hole (open door) created by a misconfigured AP to launch an attack on the corporate network.

Mis-configured AP
Rouge AP

Rogue Clients

Traffic Analysis

Attacker can either plugged an unauthorised AP into the corporate network or use a
computer (e.g. laptop) running software fake AP to provide wireless access to Wi-Fi clients
within the range.
Attacker actively access an authorised cooperate wireless network via mis-configured AP
(e.g. encryption turned off) or through an AP after compromising
encryption/authentication.
Attacker passively monitors transmissions to identify communication patterns and
participants.

The applications of wireless technologies are found in many medical devices. The wireless communication system allows
two way communication, information exchange and control of many different events. The wireless capability applies to
both sensor and actuator systems and hence the range of risks is wide. In Table 2 a summary is made of potential adverse
events that may occur if a wireless application fails to perform as intended (Hansen & Hansen, 2010, p. 15). In Table 3 a
summary of potential threats against wireless systems is made, the related security requirement defined and possible
security solutions specified (Ng, Sim & Tan, 2006, p. 141). The best-case scenario is that all possible security threats can
be treated and will not materialise in a wireless medical network. The weaker case is that the possibility of adverse
occurrences is reduced to a minor probability by mitigation of the causal factors. The residual risk in this instance should
be such that the unintended variation can be managed within normal medical procedures and practices in such a way that
the end user of the services has no negative consequences. With careful preparation and adequate protective measures
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wireless networks and wireless medical devices can deliver a better life experience and health opportunity. Our research
highlights the trade-offs required for secure systems. A full assessment of the costs and benefits can reduce the potential
of harm to an unremarkable amount that has no material impact on safety. However, reaching a point where a medical
system is sufficiently robust and does not deliver adverse events requires comprehensive consideration of all probable
controls. In the next section, we shall discuss the role of standards and standardisation in securing wireless medical
systems.
Table 2. Potential adverse events in various implantable medical devices (Hansen & Hansen, 2010, p. 15)
Device
Adverse Events
Pacemaker, Implanted Cardiac Defibrillator (Mirowski et
Heart failure, Tachycardia, Bradycardia, Arrhythmia
al., 1970); Ventricular Assist Device (Glenville & Ross,
1986)
Cochlear Implant
Deafness, Phantom sounds, Distraction/Confusion
Prosthetic Limb Control System (Velliste et al., 2008)
Injury, Damage to prosthetic limb, Inadvertent
movement
Spinal Cord Simulator (Brindley et al., 1982)
Loss of pain relief, Inappropriate stimulation
Sacral Anterior Root Simulator (Brindley et al., 1982)
Infection from inability to void, Inappropriate
stimulation
Retinal Prosthesis (Chow et al., 2004), Implanted Contact
Blindness, Phantom images, Distraction/Confusion
Lens, Intraocular Lens
Implanted Infusion Pump
Inappropriate dosage/timing
Brain-Machine Interface and Other Neuroprosthesis
Loss of consciousness, Neural effects (Denning et al.,
(Santhanam et al., 2006; Song et al., 2009)
2009)
Responsive Neurostimulator and Other Deep Brain
Simulator (Sun et al., 2008)
Implanted Monitor or Sensor
Implanted RFID Tag (Halamka et al., 2006)
Implanted Dynamic LED Tatto

Inappropriate stimulation, Failure to stimulate
Incorrect readings
Loss of privacy, Data leakage
Inappropriate display

Standards provide the opportunity for interoperability between medical systems and interoperability between the different
medical devices. However, there is one substantial limitation with regard to the applications of wireless technologies in
healthcare systems. The problem is the "the lack of interoperability among devices belonging to different vendors, even
if they physically use the same wireless technology" (Delmastro, 2012, p. 1292). There is also a need for common data
formats and transmission frequencies.
Table 3. Wireless sensor networks security threats, security requirements and possible solutions
(Ng et al., 2006, p. 141)
Security Threats
Security Requirements
Possible Security Solutions
Unauthenticated or
unauthorised access

Key establishment and trust setup

 Random key distribution
 Public key cryptography

Message disclosure

Confidentiality and privacy

Message modification

Integrity and authenticity

Denial-of-service (DoS)

Availability

Node capture and
compromised node

Resilience to node compromise

Routing attacks
Intrusion and high-level
security attacks

Secure routing
Secure group management, intrusion
detection, secure data aggregation

 Link/network layer encryption
 Access control
 Keyed secure hash function
 Digital signature
 Intrusion detection
 Redundancy
 Inconsistency detection and node
revocation
 Tamper-proofing
 Secure routing protocols
 Secure group communication
 Intrusion detection
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There are numerous guidelines and standards related to medical healthcare technology. These guidelines and standards
are created and embraced by international organizations, government agencies and professional or specialised
organizations and societies (David & Judd, 2006). There are more than “20,000 individual standards and guidelines
produced by 600 organizations and agencies from North America alone” (David & Judd, 2006, p. 75-14). Some of the
standards address design and manufacturing practices for medical devices and related software although others apply to
the safety and performance requirements for particular technologies (for instance, electrical and radiation safety
standards). Likewise, standards are also required for the “coding and structure of clinical patient care data; the content of
data sets for specific purposes; and electronic transmission of such data to integrate data efficiently across departmental
systems within a hospital and data from the systems of other hospitals and healthcare providers” (Fitzmaurice, 2006, p.
41-42).
Table 4. Summarised top ten medical device challenges and possible solutions
Challenge
1. Interfacing between devices
and information systems

Possible Solution/Best Practice
Provide appropriate education and training to users or technicians.

2.

Maintaining computerized
equipment and systems

3.

Managing alarms

4.

Maintaining and processing
endoscopes

5.

Broken connectors

6.

Wireless management

7.

Battery management

8.

Problems with patient monitors
(in-hospitals or at home, at
work and around the
community)

Medical device manufacturers should validate their equipment with the most
popular anti-virus and should provide clear instructions on how to install antivirus program on particular devices.
Clinical staff should be given education and training about the alarm setup,
default settings and proper use of alarms in order to avoid the life and death
of patients when alarms could not either be heard or ignored.
Users should be given proper education and training on how to clean, sterilize
and maintain endoscopes as such devices are very sensitive and can be
broken easily.
Virtually all medical devices have some sort of connector and they can be
difficult to replace. Furthermore, broken connectors are the most common
cause of no problems founds (NPFs) when a clinician raises a concern about
a device and then a technician checks it out. To prevent the issues related to
broken connectors, setting a timer in connectors to remind if replacements
are needed after a number of predefined connections has been reached.
The demand in wireless enabled medical devices for flexibility is raising one
of the challenges in hospital/healthcare industry. Proper education and
training should be given to users and IT personnel in order to maintain the
devices.
Healthcare facilities and patients/users of the medical devices should have
efficient battery maintenance and replacement in their budgets as part of the
preventive maintenance (PM) program. It is important to give proper training
users and patients/users of the medical devices. Likewise, additional
replacement battery packs and chargers should be given to mobile users of
physiological monitors and defibrillators as batteries can easily be failed due
to no power outlets available.
Users have to work with appropriate stakeholders, IT and clinicians to
establish a risk management process that identifies vulnerabilities associated
with patient monitoring systems and devices in order to mitigate all
substantial risks.

9.

Problems with dialysis
equipment

10. Managing the radiation dose
from Computed Tomography
(CT)

It is essential to review the service schedule with clinicians and nurse
managers responsible for dialysis service in advance of scheduled
maintenance.
Radiation overdose and other dose errors is a top health technology hazard
as a result of human error (wrongly administered radiation) or softwarerelated errors. Users have to work with appropriate stakeholders, IT and
clinicians to keep up the performance of such therapy systems and devices
by regular maintenance.
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The International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) and others are formulating standards for the safety of wireless
medical systems. For example, specific standards include:








Digital Imaging and Communications (DICOM)
Health Level Seven International (HL7)
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
European Union Data Protection Directive (1998)
Medical Data Interchange (MEDIX) Standard
IEEE P1073 Medical Information Bus (MIB)
International Standard Organization/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (ISO/IEEE 11073 or X73),
Personal Health Data (PHD).

The establishment of a robust system also requires control of many minor matters that are best associated with
management policies, processes, procedures, and audit controls. Wireless connections now permeate all medical systems
and devices and much risk can be treated by general management systems. In Table 4 the top ten challenges associated
with managing medical devices are listed and risk mitigation strategies listed (Loughlin & Williams, 2011, pp. 99-103).

DISCUSSION
Wireless medical systems and devices offer measureable advantages for the delivery of medical services and end user
flexibility. The vulnerability of wireless systems to attack, to mistakes and to technical problems has been reviewed in
the background literature and requires risk management in order to maintain a safe environment. The degree to which
vulnerabilities can escalate into serious events is amplified by the sensitivity of medical services. Events have implications
for life quality, privacy and work effectiveness. Consequently, any residual risk has to be treated within the professional
actions of a normal days work. However, published reports reviewed above related to the deployment of wireless
communications and wireless medical devices in the healthcare industry show there have been a number of issues, events
and challenges that have reduced the potential benefits. Prudent risk management has the ability to assure fewer adverse
events and greater benefits. The numerous issues reviewed involved a lack of comprehensive coverage of wireless and
mobile networks, reliability of wireless infrastructure, general limitations of handheld devices, medical usability of
sensors and mobile devices, interference with other medical devices, privacy and security, misuse and malicious activities.
The issues and challenges that require solution for effective service delivery can be grouped into five key areas; resources,
electromagnetic spectrum, malicious attacks, standards and privacy.
Generally, wireless medical devices have limited resources (e.g. computational power, memory, and battery power). The
resource constrains is one of the factors that can lead to compromised security and privacy of patients or device users.
This also applies to the size of cryptographic algorithms that can be used. Similarly, the use of the electromagnetic
spectrum for wireless communication introduces a capacity that is less than most wired networks. The nature of wireless
devices allows the users of those devices to go anywhere at any time. As a result, there exists a potential issue related to
the Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) among wireless medical devices employing the same ISM frequency band of
2.4GHz. For example, a Bluetooth enabled device can cause delay in transferring patient data and a packet loss up to 60%
in a WPAN Electrocardiogram (ECG) monitor at very close range. When collaborative and non-collaborative actions are
applied to mitigate the interference issues caused by the coexistence of WLAN and Bluetooth enabled devices the problem
with interference is still unavoidable. Thus, there is a need for a strict monitoring and control of the spectrum usage in
order to detect usage constantly, and to direct the choice of which technology to use. A similar service problem arises in
many hospital buildings where heavy concrete structures and other obstacles can attenuate signals preventing the full use
of bandwidth and EM resources.
The risk in medical systems of privacy breeches and inappropriate use of resources is high. A smaller but related risk is
that of people hacking into the systems to achieve similar ends and impacts of an equal significance. Disruption to any
medical service impacts patient health and life opportunities; whether it causes delays, extra costs, and inappropriate
disclosures or affects the correct delivery of fluids or other services. In Table 1 the major threats to types of wireless
networks and devices are summarised. In Table 2 the potential adverse events that may occur in some of the wireless
enabled medical devices are also listed. These risks and consequences suggest that securing wireless networks and devices
is crucial to patient safety at both a technical and managerial level. The security trade-off of these medical systems is the
benefit of mobility and access. The medical services require protection from internal and external attacks while
maintaining the best possible benefits for the patient and professionals from the technology. Insider attacks come from
staff that may unintentionally or intentionally cause errors, loss of availability and integrity, financial loss and disclosure
of sensitive information or the loss of physical assets. These risks may be mitigated by policies and managerial controls
but they are difficult to eliminate. Table 4 summarises the top ten solutions for wireless medical device risk treatment.
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The social and dynamic nature of human interaction introduces risk that cannot be zeroed without eliminating the very
nature of the service being provided. External attacks are easier to defend against because standard IT protection
mechanisms such as the firewalls or intrusion prevention systems and defence strategies can be applied to protect IT
systems. Similarly, physical access to a hospital or healthcare organization can be controlled and unwanted access
prevented. Again, the biggest threat is if social engineering techniques are applied and a malicious agent from outside of
the system impersonates or seizes the identity of a beneficial agent then the system security is compromised. The context
is the cost-benefit trade-off that reduces the effectiveness of perfect security solutions in proportion to user expectations.
In a socially dynamic and socially engaged professional and community-based service, health has to engage and interface
with many uncontrolled and deliberately uncontrollable variables. For example, a patient expects to be mobile and perhaps
travel internationally when they have a pacemaker fitted to their heart. The health professionals in any country expect to
have access to the pacemaker to provide the health services, when it is required. The risk is that with such open and
potentially hopeful arrangements that the protective systems are not as secure as the current state of security knowledge
for mobile devices allows. Few international standards cover interoperability and security of technologies in such
circumstances. The problem then remains of accepting best intentions when mistakes and malicious activity may occur.
Standardisation has the greatest potential to treat security risks for wireless devices in health systems. Table 3 also adds
techniques for mitigating threats and providing appropriate solutions. Managing security risks for wireless medical
devices is an underdeveloped research area that requires further theorising. The issues arise because the solutions for best
IT security may not appropriately fit the health services environment. The nature of health services requires high integrity
in not only biological areas but also IT technical areas. The non-human IT objects interface and interact with humans and
consequently require diverse responses to complex and high-risk human life situations. The health environment is
constantly evolving to meet the requirements of services and the growing expectations of patients and professional staff.
The performance of a doctor-nurse communication system, for example, has evolved from a simple telephone system, to
text-based pagers and now into smart phone technologies. Along with the IT capability evolution so has the user
expectations for performance, capability and effectiveness for health services evolved. The security of wireless medical
devices is to go through similar transformations from the current situation and towards a better fit of protection and usage.
Currently the ease of use for all stakeholders is traded against the perception of secure services and patient safety. Adverse
events and growing user expectations will demand greater service integrity and benefits realisation.

CONCLUSION
The research and analysis suggest that the debate of securing wireless medical systems is not yet over. The literature
shows that wireless systems are more vulnerable than wired systems to unplanned events and several key issues need to
be solved. In the medical systems environment, medical devices and the service infrastructures require a minimal residual
risk for potential disruption to the medical services. Managing the security risks is crucial to patient safety and system
integrity. We are suggesting recognition of the requirements of socially engaged services in a medical environment and
the subsequent cost of not being able to implement perfect IT security solutions, which leaves open the door for further
research and IT security services development.
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